Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences by Sprevak, Mark
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences
Citation for published version:
Sprevak, M 2016, Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences. in P Humphreys (ed.), Oxford
Handbook for the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/20.500.11820/f84d50e7-
5864-4038-a30b-a8e0b937ebbc, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.5
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
20.500.11820/f84d50e7-5864-4038-a30b-a8e0b937ebbc
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.5
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Science
Publisher Rights Statement:
Sprevak, M. (2016). Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences. In P. Humphreys (Ed.), Oxford
Handbook for the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press., reproduced by permission of Oxford
University Press http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199368815-e-5
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
Forthcoming in P. Humphreys (Ed.) OxfordHandbook for the Philo-
sophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.5
mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk
Philosophy of the psychological and
cognitive sciences
Mark Sprevak
University of Edinburgh
20March 2016
his chapter surveys work in philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences.
he survey is organized by the type of task that philosophers have taken on. he author
focuses on four types of task: (1) how we should interpret theories in cognitive science,
(2) how we should precisify theoretical concepts in cognitive science, (3) how theories
or methodologies in cognitive science cohere, and (4) how cognitive states, processes,
and capacities should be individuated.
1 Introduction
Philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences is a broad and heterogeneous
domain. he psychological and cognitive sciences are rapidly evolving, fragmented,
and oen lacking in theories that are as precise as onemight like. Consequently,
philosophers of science have a challenging subject matter: fast moving, variegated,
and sometimes slightly fuzzy. Nevertheless, the psychological and cognitive sciences
are fertile ground for philosophers. Philosophers can bring their skills to bear with
productive eòect: in interpreting scientiûc theories, precisifying concepts, exploring
relations of explanatory and logical coherence between theories, and in typing
psychological states, processes, and capacities.
In this chapter, I organize work in philosophy of the psychological and cognitive
science by the kind of task that philosophers have taken on. he tasks on which I
focus are:
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1. How should we interpret theories in cognitive science?
2. How should we precisify theoretical concepts in cognitive science?
3. How do theories or methodologies in cognitive science ût together?
4. How should cognitive states, processes, and capacities be individuated?
None of these tasks is distinctively philosophical: not in the sense of being of interest
only to philosophers nor in the sense that philosophers would be the best people to
solve them. All of the tasks engage a wide range of inquirers; all are carried out to
the highest standards by a diverse group of individuals. What marks these tasks out
as special is that they are among the problems that tend to interest philosophers and
to whose solution philosophers tend to be well placed to contribute. Philosophy of
the psychological and cognitive sciences is not deûned by questions that set it apart
from other forms of inquiry. It is characterized by questions, shared with other
researchers, that tend to suit the skills, and attract the interest of, philosophers.
hree qualiûcations before proceeding. First, this chapter does not attempt to cover
non-cognitive research in the psychological sciences (e.g., diòerential or social
psychology). For the purposes of this chapter, ‘psychological science’ and ‘cognitive
science’ will be used interchangeably. Second, the term ‘theory’ will be used loosely,
and looser than is normal in other areas of philosophy of science. ‘heory’ may
refer to a full-edged theory or a model, description of a mechanism, sketch, or
even a general claim. Finally, the tasks I discuss, and the particular examples I give,
only sample work in philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences. I focus
on a small number of cases that I hope are illustrative of wider, structurally similar
projects. he examples are not intended to be a list of the best work in the ûeld, but
only examples by which to orientate oneself.
Let us consider the four tasks in turn.
2 Interpreting
A crude way to divide up scientiûc work is between theory building and theory
interpretation. heory building involves identifying empirical eòects and coming
up with a theory to predict, test, and explain those eòects. heory interpretation
concerns how – granted the empirical prowess or otherwise of a theory – we should
understand that theory. Interpretation involves more than assigning a semantics.
he job of interpretation is to understand the import of the theory: What is the
purpose of the descriptions and physical models used to express the theory? What
are the criteria of success for the theory: truth, empirical adequacy, instrumental
value, or something else? Which terms in the theory are referring terms? Which
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kinds of ontological commitments does a theory entail? Which aspects of a theory
are essential?
Philosophers have tools to help with theory interpretation. Analogues to the ques-
tions above have been pursued for ethical, normative, mathematical, and other
scientiûc discourses. A range of options have been developed concerning theory
interpretation, amongst which are versions of realism and instrumentalism. A
theory interpretation set a combination of semantic, pragmatic, and ontological
parameters regarding a theory. Our job is to see which setting results in the best
interpretation of a psychological theory.
hese concernshave recentlyplayed outwithBayesianmodels of cognition. Bayesian
models predict and explain an impressive array of human behavior. For example,
Bayesian models provide a good, predictivemodel of human behavior in sensory
cue integration tasks (Ernst and Banks 2002). In these tasks, subjects are presented
with a single stimulus in two diòerent sensorymodalities (say, touch and vision)
and asked to make judgments about that stimulus by combining information from
the two modalities. For example, subjects may be presented with two ridges and
asked to decide, using touch and vision, which ridge is taller. Ernst and Banks
found that subjects’ behavior could be predicted if we assume that the input to each
sensory modality is represented by a probability density function and that these
representations are combined using the Bayesian calculus to yield a single estimate.
Probability density functions and Bayesian computational machinery do a good
job of predicting human behavior in sensory cue integration. Bayesian models also
appear to explain human behavior. his is because they tie human behavior to the
optimal way in which to weigh evidence. Many aspects of human behavior have
been modeled with this kind of Bayesian approach, including causal learning and
reasoning, category learning and inference,motor control, and decision making
(Pouget et al. 2013).
How should we interpret these Bayesian models?
One option is realism. his is known within psychology as the Bayesian brain hypo-
thesis. Here, the central terms of Bayesianmodels – the probability density functions
and Bayesian computational methods – are interpreted as picking out real (and as
yet unobserved) entities and processes in the human brain. he brain ‘represents
information probabilistically, by coding and computing with probability density
functions or approximations to probability density functions,’ and those probabil-
istic representations enter into Bayesian, or approximately Bayesian, inference via
neural computation (Knill and Pouget 2004, p. 713). Bayesian models are both a
theory of human behavior and of the neural and computational machinery that
underpin the behavior. Realism about Bayesian models is usually qualiûed with
the claim that current Bayesian models of cognition are only approximately true.
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What current Bayesian models get right is that the brain encodes information prob-
abilistically and that it implements some form of approximate Bayesian inference.
he precise format of the probabilistic representations and the precisemethod of
approximate Bayesian inference is le open to future inquiry (Griõths et al. 2012).
Another interpretation option for Bayesian models is instrumentalism (Bowers and
Davis 2012; Colombo and Seriès 2012;Danks 2008; Jones and Love 2011). According
to the instrumentalist, Bayesian models do not aim to describe the underlying
neurocomputational mechanisms (other than providing general constraints on
their inputs and outputs). he central terms of Bayesian models – probability
density functions and Bayesian computational machinery – should be understood,
not as referring to hidden neural entities and processes, but as formal devices
that allow experimenters to describe human behavioral patterns concisely. he
instrumentalist allows that the underlying neural mechanisms could be Bayesian.
But this possibility should be distinguished from the content of current Bayesian
models. he aim of thosemodels is to predict behavior. he success of Bayesian
models in predicting behavior is not evidence that themechanisms that generate
that behavior are Bayesian. Onemight be inspired by the success of Bayesianmodels
in predicting behavior to entertain the Bayesian brain hypothesis. But inspiration
is not evidential support. Bayesian models should be understood as aiming at
behavioral adequacy. heir aim is to predict behavior and specify human behavioral
competences, not to describe neural or computational mechanisms.
Herewe have two incompatible proposals about how to interpret Bayesianmodels of
cognition. he diòerence between the two proposals matters. Do Bayesian models
tell us how our cognitive processes work? According to realism, they do. According
to instrumentalism, they do not (or, at least, they only provide constraints on inputs
and outputs). How do we decide which interpretation option is correct?
he primary rationale for instrumentalism is epistemic caution. Instrumentalism
makes a strictly weaker claim than realism while remaining consistent with the data.
here appear to be good reasons for epistemic caution too. First, onemight worry
about underdetermination. Many non-Bayesian mechanisms generate Bayesian
behavior. A lookup table, in the limit, can generate the same behavior as a Bayesian
mechanism. Why should we believe that the brain uses Bayesian methods given the
vast number of behaviorally indistinguishable, non-Bayesian, alternatives? Second,
onemight worry about the underspeciûcation ofmechanisms in current Bayesian
models. he Bayesian brain hypothesis is a claim about neurocomputational mech-
anisms. here are a huge number ofways inwhich a behaviorally-adequate Bayesian
model could be implemented, both neurally and computationally. Current Bayesian
models tend to be silent about their neural or computational implementation in
actual brains. Absent speciûcation of the neurocomputational implementation, we
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shouldmost charitably interpret current Bayesian theories as simply not making a
claim about neural or computational mechanisms at all.
What reasons are there for realism? A common inductive inferential pattern in
science is to go beyond an instrumentalist interpretation if a theory has a suõciently
impressive track record of prediction and explanation (Putnam 1975). Arguably,
Bayesian models do have such a track record. herefore, our interpretation of
Bayesian models of cognition should be realist. he burden on the instrumentalist
to show otherwise: to show that the brain does not use probabilistic representations
or Bayesian inference. And current scientiûc evidence gives us no reason to think
that the brain does not use Bayesian methods (Rescorla 2016).
he disagreement between the realist and the instrumentalist is not epiphenomenal
to scientiûc practice. he choice onemakes aòects whether, and how, experimental
results bear on Bayesian models. For example, if instrumentalism is correct, then
no neural evidence could tell in favor (or against) a Bayesian model. he reason
is straightforward: themodels are not in the business ofmaking any claim about
neural implementation, so there is nothing in the model for neural evidence to
contest. If realism about Bayesian models is correct, then neural evidence is relevant
to conûrming the Bayesian models. If there is neural evidence that the Bayesian
model’s probability distributions ormethods occur in the brain, then that is evidence
in favor of the model. If there is evidence against, that is evidence against the
Bayesian model. Bayesian models are evaluated not only by their ût to behavioral
data, but also by their neural plausibility.
Bowers and Davis (2012) object that Bayesian theories of cognition are trivial or
lacking empirical content. heir objection is that almost any dataset could be
modeled as the output of some or other Bayesian model. Speciûc Bayesian models
could be conûrmed or disconûrmed by empirical data, but the general Bayesian
approach is bound to succeed no matter what. Bayesianism is no more conûrmed
by behavioral data than number theory is conûrmed. If the instrumentalist is
right, then Bowers and Davis’s objection has bite. Some or another Bayesian model
will always ût a behavioral dataset. However, if the realist is right, then it is no
longer clear that Bowers and Davis’s objection succeeds. Realism raises the stakes
of Bayesianism. his opens up the possibility that Bayesianism could be subject
to empirical test. Precisely how to test it is not yet obvious. he reason is that
currently there are no agreed proposals about the neural implementation of Bayesian
models’ theoretical posits (probability density functions andBayesian computational
processes). Nevertheless, realism at least opens the door to the possibility of testing
Bayesianism. Suppose one were to have a theory of neural implementation in hand.
If the brain’s measured neural representations and computations – identiûable via
the implementation proposal – really do have the properties ascribed byBayesianism,
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then the general Bayesian approach would be vindicated. If not – for example, if
the brain turns out to employ non-probabilistic representations or to manipulate
its representations via a lookup table – then Bayesianism about cognition would
be found to be false. A theory of implementation plus neural evidence allows
Bayesianism about cognition to be tested.
Interpreting a theory requires making decisions about the theory’s goals (truth
vs. instrumental accuracy) and how to interpret its theoretical terms (referring
vs. formal devices). A ûnal aspect of interpretation is the decision about which
claims a theory includes. Which parts of a theory are essential, and which are
explication or trimming?
Suppose that realism about Bayesian models is correct and therefore that the brain
manipulates probabilistic representations. What does a Bayesian model require of
these representations? Some things are clearly required: the representations must be
probabilistic hypotheses, and theymust encode information about the uncertainty
of events as well as their truth conditions or accuracy conditions. But to which
entities and events do these probabilistic hypotheses refer? Do they refer to distal
objects in the environment (e.g., tables and chairs) or to mathematical entities (e.g.,
numerical values of a parameter in an abstract graphical model). In other words,
does the correct interpretation of a Bayesian model of cognition make reference to
distal objects in the organism’s environment, or is the correct interpretation entirely
formal andmathematical?
On either view, entertaining a probabilistic hypothesis could enable an organism to
succeed. On the ûrst, ‘distal content’, option, this could be because the probabilistic
hypotheses are the organism’s best guess about the state of its environment, and that
appears to be useful information for an organism to consider when deciding how
to act in its environment (Rescorla 2015). On this view, neural representations of
distal environment stimuli would be an essential part of a Bayesian story, not an
optional extra. If this is correct, it wouldmean that Bayesianism about cognition
is incompatible with eliminativism or ûctionalism about neural representations of
distal objects (Keijzer 1998; McDowell 2010; Sprevak 2013).
On the second, ‘mathematical content’, option, the organism could reliably succeed
because the probabilistic hypotheses describe amathematical structure that is ad-
aptive for the organism to consider in its environment. his need not be because
themathematical structure represents distal properties in the environment. here
are other ways than representation in which inferences over a formal structure
could reliably lead to successful action. Formal properties may track contingent
nomological connections between the organism’s environment, body, and sensory
system. Consider that it is adaptive for an organism to consider the result of ap-
plying a Fourier transform to the values of incoming signals from the auditory
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nerve, or for an organism to consider the results of applying∇2G to the values of the
incoming signal from its retina. hese are useful transformations for an organism
to consider even if neither is a representation of a distal environmental property.
Egan (2010) argues for a ‘mathematical content’ interpretation of classical computa-
tional models in cognitive science. Her reasoning could be extended to Bayesian
models. According to such a view, it is adaptive for an organism to consider the
mathematical relations described by the Bayesian model even though the terms in
that model do not represent distal properties or events in the environment. On this
view, representations of distal objects would not be an essential part of a Bayesian
story. Distal content could feature in a Bayesian model of cognition, but it is not an
essential part of such amodel.
My intention here is not to argue for one interpretation rather than another. My
intention is only to illustrate that each theory in cognitive science requires interpret-
ation. here are entailments between theory interpretation options. Just as in other
areas of science, some aspects of psychological theories should be understood as
essential, literal, fact stating, ontologically committing, whereas other aspects play
a diòerent role. It takes care and sensitivity to hit on the correct interpretation, or
even to narrow the interpretation options down. his cannot be achieved simply by
appealing to the utterances of theory builders because those utterances themselves
need interpretation. heories do not wear their interpretation on their sleeves.
3 Precisifying
Imprecision is bad, not only for its own sake, but also because it permits fallacious
inference. If one did not know the diòerence between the two senses of ‘bank,’
onemight wrongly infer that since a river has two banks, a river would be a good
place to conduct a ûnancial transaction. hat no such confusion occurs reects that
the relevant precisiûcation is known to every competent speaker of the language.
Unfortunately, the same is not true of every term in psychology. he correct usage of
many terms in psychology – ‘consciousness’, ‘concept’, ‘module’ – is murky, even for
experts. One task towhich philosophers have contributed is to clarify our theoretical
terms so that those terms better support reliable, non-trivial, inductive inference.
his may involve distinguishing between diòerent things that fall under a term,
redeûning a term, or sometimes removing a term entirely. his is not mere semantic
busy work. Concepts are the building blocks of scientiûc theories. Fashioning
precise and inductively powerful concepts is essential to scientiûc progress (for
more on this, seeMachery (ms)).
I discuss here two examples of concepts that philosophers have helped to precisely:
the concept of consciousness and the concept of a cognitivemodule.
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he term ‘consciousness’has its origin in folkuse. Wemight say, ‘shewasn’t conscious
of the passing pedestrian,’ ‘hewas knocked unconscious in the boxing ring,’ or speak
of the ‘conscious’ experience of smelling a rose,making love, or hearing a symphony,
making life worth living. Scientiûc and philosophical work on consciousness only
started to make progress when it distinguished diòerent things that fall under the
folk term. Precisifying the concept of consciousness has enabled researchers to have
a ûghting chance to discover the purpose, functional mechanism, and neural basis
of consciousness.
A preliminary precisiûcation of consciousness is arousal. Whenwe say that someone
is conscious, we might mean that she is alert and awake; she is not asleep or in-
capacitated. When in dreamless sleep, or in a pharmacological coma, a person
is unconscious. his sense of ‘consciousness’ is usually accompanied by the as-
sumption that the predicate ‘. . . is conscious’ is amonadic predicate. Someone is
simply conscious or unconscious; they need not be conscious of something speciûc.
Someonemay also be conscious in the sense of being arousedwithout being capable
of consciousness in the sense of being aware of particular stimuli. Patients in a veget-
ative state show sleep-wake cycles, hence arousal, but they are not aware of particular
stimuli. he neural mechanisms that govern consciousness-as-arousal also appear
distinct from those that govern consciousness-as-awareness. Arousal is regulated by
neural systems in the brainstem, notably, the reticular activating system. In contrast,
the neural basis of consciousness-as-awareness appears to be in higher cortical
regions and their subcortical reciprocal connections. Consciousness-as-arousal
and consciousness-as-awareness have diòerent purposes, relate to diòerent aspects
of functional cognitive architecture, and have diòerent neural implementations
(Laureys et al. 2009).
Ned Block’s concept of access consciousness is one way to further precisify
consciousness-as-awareness (Block 1995). A mental representation is deûned
as access conscious if and only if ‘it is poised for free use in reasoning and for
direct “rational” control of action and speech’ (p. 382). One indicator of access
consciousness is verbal reportability –whether the subject can say he or she is aware
of a given mental episode. Reportability is, however, neither necessary nor suõcient
for access consciousness. Block’s precisiûcation of consciousness-as-awareness
highlights a number of other properties of consciousness-as-awareness. First, access
consciousness is attributed with a relational predicate: an individual is conscious of
something. Second, the object of that individual’s consciousness is determined by a
representation encoded in their brain. hird, access consciousness requires that
this representation be ‘broadcast widely’ in their brain: it should be available to
central reasoning processes and able to cause a wide variety of behavior, including
verbal report. Fourth, the representation need not have actual behavioral eòects;
it need only have the disposition to cause appropriate behavioral eòects. his
8
catalogue provides a partial functional speciûcation of consciousness-as-awareness.
Empirical work has focused on identifying which, if any, neural properties answer
to this description (Baars 1997; Dehaene and Changeux 2004).
Despite its virtues, there are idiosyncrasies inBlock’s precisiûcation of consciousness-
as-awareness: Why is rational control necessary for access consciousness? What
does it mean for a neural representation to be ‘poised’ to have eòects but not actually
have them? What does it mean for a representation to ‘directly’ control behavior
given that all control of behavior is mediated by other neural systems? he best way
to see Block’s account is as a stepping stone along the way to an appropriate concept
of consciousness-as-awareness.
Forging the right notion of consciousness-as-awareness is not a task for armchair
reection. Precisiûcation does not proceed prior to, or independently of, empirical
inquiry. Precisiûcation involves a two-way interaction between empirical hypo-
theses and consideration of how changes to the concepts that make up the empirical
hypotheses would better capture the patterns relevant to scientiûc psychology. Pre-
cisiûcation of a concept must be informed by the utility of the resulting concept
to scientiûc practice. A precisiûcation of consciousness-as-awareness proves its
worth by whether the way it groups phenomena pays oò for achieving goals in
scientiûc psychology. Groupings that yield reliable inductive inferences or explan-
atory uniûcation are those that should be favored. For example, a precisiûcation
of consciousness-as-awareness should aim to pick out shared facts about purpose,
cognitive functional architecture, and neural implementation of consciousness-as-
awareness. Recent work suggests that consciousness-as-awareness should be split
into smaller concepts as no one conceptmeets all three of these conditions (Dehaene
et al. 2006; Koch and Tsuchiya 2006).
he concepts of consciousness-as-arousal and consciousness-as-awareness are dis-
tinct from the concept of phenomenal consciousness. he concept of phenomenal
consciousness picks out the qualitative feel – ‘what it is like’ – associated with some
mental episodes. It feels a certainway to taste chocolate; it feels a certainway to taste
mint; and those two feelings are diòerent. Phenomenal consciousness is character-
ized purely ostensively and from a subjective, ûrst-person point of view. Consider
your mental life, pay attention to the qualitative feelings that accompany certain
episodes – those are phenomenally conscious feelings. Given that our concept of
phenomenal consciousness is rooted in ûrst-person reection, it is not surprising
that this concept has proven hard to place in relation to scientiûc concepts related to
brain function. Dehaene (2014) suggests that the concept of phenomenal conscious-
ness should for the moment be set aside in pursuing a science of consciousness;
phenomenal consciousness is not currently amenable to scientiûc explanation.
In his introduction to modularity, Fodor (1983) lists nine features that characterize a
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cognitivemodule: domain speciûcity,mandatory operation, limited central access-
ibility, fast processing, informational encapsulation, shallow outputs, ûxed neural
architecture, characteristic and speciûc breakdown patterns, and characteristic onto-
genetic pace and sequencing. Whether amechanism counts as amodule depends on
whether it meets a weighted sum of these features to an ‘interesting’ extent (Fodor
1983, p. 37). What counts as interesting, and how diòerent features from the list
should be weighed, is le largely unspeciûed. As onemight imagine, there is room
for precisifying the concept ofmodularity in diòerent ways. Fodor claimed that the
nine listed properties typically co-occur. Subsequent work has shown that they do
not. Moreover, even if they did co-occur, their co-occurrence would not necessarily
be of interest to scientiûc psychology (Elsabbagh and Karmiloò-Smith 2006; Prinz
2006). he concept of a psychological module has since been precisiûed in diòerent
ways and for diòerent purposes. his has been done by giving priority to diòerent
properties associated with modularity from Fodor’s list.
Fodor himself gives highest priority to two properties from the list: domain spe-
ciûcity and informational encapsulation (Fodor 2000). hese properties are distinct.
Domain speciûcity is a restriction on the inputs that a mechanism may receive.
Amechanism is domain speciûc if only certain representations turn themodule
on, or are processed by themodule. For example, in the visual system, a domain-
speciûcmodulemight only process information about retinal disparity and ignore
everything else. Informational encapsulation is diòerent. Amechanism is informa-
tionally encapsulated if, once themechanism is processing an input, the information
that themechanismmay then draw on is less than the sum total of information in the
cognitive system. For example, in the visual system an informationally encapsulated
module that processes information about retinal disparitymight not be able to draw
on the system’s centrally held beliefs. Illusions like theMüller–Lyer illusion appear
to show that the visual system is, to some extent, informationally encapsulated.
his gets us in the right ball park for precisifying the concept of a cognitivemodule,
but domain speciûcity and information encapsulation need to bemore carefully
characterized. Informational encapsulation requires that something like the fol-
lowing three further conditions be met (Samuels 2005). First, the informational
encapsulation should not be short-lived; it should be a relatively enduring char-
acteristic of themechanism. Second, informational encapsulation should not be
the product of performance factors, such as fatigue, lack of time, or lapses in at-
tention. hird, informational encapsulation need not shield themechanism from
every external inuence. Processing may, for example, be aòected by attentional
mechanisms (Coltheart 1999). Informational encapsulation requires ‘cognitive im-
penetrability.’ Roughly, this means that although themechanism may bemodulated
by certain informational factors (e.g., attention), it cannot bemodulated by others
(e.g., the high-level beliefs, goals, or similar representational states of the organism).
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Pinning this down more precisely requires work (seeMachery (2015); Firestone and
Scholl (2015)).
Both domain speciûcity and informational encapsulation admit of degrees. Not
just any step down from complete informational promiscuity produces domain
speciûcity or information encapsulation. Moreover, the step down is not merely
numerical, but also a matter of kind. he input domain and the informational
database should be, in some sense, uniûed. One should be able to characterize the
mechanism as amodule for X, where X is some task or process that makes sense as
a single unit in the light of concerns about the purpose and cognitive architecture
of the organism. Illuminating the precise nature of this constraint on modularity is
non-trivial.
he concepts of domain speciûcity and informational encapsulation oòer scope for
the development of a palette of distinct precisiûcations of the concept of a cognition
module. If one turns attention to other properties associated with modularity in
Fodor’s list,more scope for divergent precisiûcations emerges. One could think of
Fodor’s criteria as conceptually separable parameters that are important in theoriz-
ing about themind or brain (Elsabbagh and Karmiloò-Smith 2006). Some criteria
may be more important for capturing certain kinds of pattern – computational,
anatomical, developmental, and so on – than others. Which kind of pattern one
wishes to capture depends on the interests of the investigator. Diòerent concepts
ofmodularitymay include various combinations of these criteria. How we should
separate out and sharpen the parameters of Fodor’s characterization into one or
more useful working concepts depends on the kinds of pay-oò previously described.
A precisiûcation ofmodularity should help inquirers achieve their scientiûc goals.
It should allow us to capture empirical patterns relevant to scientiûc psychology.
Achieving this requires a two-way interaction between empirical inquiry and reec-
tion on how changes to the concepts that make up the empirical hypotheses would
allow us to better pick up on signiûcant empirical patterns.
Beforemoving on, it is worth noting that there is also beneût in having imprecise
concepts. Lack of precision in one’s concepts may sometimes result in a fortuitous
grouping of properties by a hypothesis. And it is not always bad for diòerent research
teams to be working with diòerent understandings of theoretical concepts or for
their inquiry to proceed with underspeciûed concepts. he promiscuous inferences
that result may sometimes be helpful in generating discovery. Nevertheless, pace
heuristic beneûts, at some stage we need to be aware of exactly which claims are
being made, and to understand when a conict between say, two research teams, is
genuine or merely verbal. Eventually, it is in everyone’s interest to precisify.
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4 Understanding how things hang together
Sellars described the task of philosophy as ‘to understand how things in the broadest
possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term’
(Sellars 1963, p. 1). One way to do this is to understand the explanatory and logical
relations between theories and the ways in which they oòer, or fail to oòer, each
other epistemic support. In this section, we examine two ways in which this is
done in philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences. First, we examine
the relationship between computational and dynamical systems theories in the
psychological sciences. Second, we examine the relationship between diòerent
levels of inquiry in the psychological sciences.
Computational theories and dynamical systems theories both attempt to explain
cognitive capacities. Both aim to explain how, in certain circumstances, we are able
to do certain tasks. However, the two theories appear to explain this in diòerent
ways.
According to the computational approach, a cognitive capacity should be explained
by giving a computational model of that capacity. Pick a cognitive capacity – for
example, the ability to infer the three-dimensional shape of an object from informa-
tion about its two-dimensional shading. An advocate of the computational approach
might oòer a computation that is able to solve this problem and suggest that this
computation, or something like it, is implemented in the brain and causally re-
sponsible for the capacity in question (Lehky and Sejnowski 1988). Computational
explanations are characterized by appeal to subpersonal representations and formal
transformations bymechanisms built from simple components.
Dynamical systems theorists also aim to explain cognitive capacities, but their
explanations appear to work diòerently. A dynamical systems theory involves
diòerential equations relating variables that correspond to abstract parameters and
time. he dynamical systems theorist claims that these parameters also correspond
to some aspects of neural and bodily activity. Diòerential equations describe how
these parameters interact over time to generate the behavior. Dynamical systems
theory explains a cognitive capacity by narrowing in on a dynamical property of
the brain or body that is causally responsible for the capacity (Schöner 2008).
Both computational theories and dynamical systems theories have had various
successes in explaining cognitive capacities. Aspects of decision-making, such as
production of the A-not-B error in infants – the phenomenon of an infant persever-
ing in reaching for box A even though she just saw the experimenter place a desired
toy in box B – are well modeled by dynamical systems theory (helen et al. 2001).
Other cognitive capacities, such as those involved in inferring three-dimensional
shape from two-dimensional information recorded by the retina, are well modeled
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by computation (Qian 1997). Our question is: How these two theories relate? If
psychology employs both, how do the theories ût together?
On the face of it, they appear to be rivals (vanGelder 1995). Each seems to instantiate
a rival bet about the nature of themind: either a cognitive capacity is produced by a
computation or it is produced by a dynamical causal relation.
On reection, this seems too strong. he computational and dynamical systems
approach agree on a great deal. hey agree that the brain is a dynamical system.
It is no part of a computational theory to deny that cognitive capacities could, or
should be, explained by a time-based evolution of physical parameters; indeed, the
computational approach proposes one class of paths through the space of physical
parameters. Computational theories might appear to diòer from dynamical systems
theories in that only computational theories employ subpersonal representations.
However, when explaining a psychological capacity, there are oen reasons – inde-
pendent of the decision to use a computational or dynamical systems theory – to
introduce subpersonal representations (p. 376; Bechtel 1998). Some psychological
capacities are ‘representation hungry’; for example, some capacities require the
system to keep track of absent stimuli (Clark and Toribio 1994). Explaining these
capacities motivates the introduction of subpersonal representations, no matter
whether one places those representations in a computational or dynamical sys-
tems context. Furthermore, it is unclear whether subpersonal representations are
really a necessary commitment of a computational approach. Not every state in
a computation needs to be representational. It is an open question how much, if
any, of amechanism need have representational properties in a computational ap-
proach (Piccinini 2008). Appeal to subpersonal representations does not show that
computational and dynamical systems theories are incompatible.
Dynamical systems theory appears to diòer from a computational approach in that
dynamical models give a special role to time. Dynamical models oòer descriptions
in which time is continuous and the transitions between states are governed by
explicitly time-based diòerential equations. Computational models – for example,
Turing machines – use discrete time evolution and are governed by rules that
do not mention time. However, not all computational models are like Turing
machines. Some computational models involve continuous time evolution and
have time-based diòerential equations as their transition rules. Within this class
are connectionist models (Eliasmith 1997) andmore recent realistic computational
models of neural function (Eliasmith 2013). hese computational models assume
continuous time evolution, contain parameters that map onto a subset of neural
and bodily properties, and use, as their transition rules, diòerential equations that
specify how the parameters evolve over time. hesemodels have all the signature
properties of dynamical systems theories.
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he distance between computational theories and dynamical systems theories is
not as great as it may ûrst appear. In some cases, the two theories converge on the
same class of model. his is not to say that every dynamical systems theory is a
computational theory or vice versa. It is rather that, in the context of explaining our
cognitive capacities, a computational approach and a dynamical systems approach
may converge: theymay employ the same elements related in the same way – repres-
entations, abstract parameters,mapping from those parameters to neural and bodily
properties, continuous time evolution, and time-based diòerential equations. he
right way to see the relationship between a computational theory and a dynamical
systems theory is not as two rivals, but as two possibly compatible alternatives.
his does not explain how classical, discrete, symbolic-rule-governed computational
models relate to the dynamical systems approach. One suggestion is that the latter
reduce to the former as a limiting case (for an attempt to show this, see Feldman
(2012)). And to understand how things hang together generally across theories
in the psychological sciences, one needs to understand the relationship between
computational theories, dynamical systems theories, and a wide range of other
theories: statistical, Bayesian, enactivist, and others. Under which conditions are
two theories rivals, compatible alternatives, or do they reduce to one another? Under
which conditions do they oòer each other epistemic support?
A secondway inwhich to understand how things hang together in the psychological
sciences is to understand how investigation at diòerent levels of inquiry coheres.
What is the relationship between inquiry at diòerent levels in the psychological
sciences?
Here, we focus on only two kinds of level: levels of spatial organization inside
mechanisms andMarr’s levels of computational explanation.
First, let us consider levels of spatial organization inside mechanisms. Diòerent
mechanisms exist at diòerent spatial scales. ‘Higher’ level mechanisms involve larger
systems and components. ‘Lower’ level mechanisms involve smaller systems and
components. We normally explain by describing mechanisms at several levels. For
example, we explain the cognitive capacity that amouse exhibits when navigating
a maze to ûnd a reward by appeal to mechanisms inside and around the mouse
at multiple spatial scales. he top-level mechanism is the entire mouse engaged
in a spatial navigation task. Within this mechanism is amechanism that involves
part of themouse’s brain, the hippocampus, storing amap of locations and orienta-
tions inside themaze. Within this mechanism, inside themouse’s hippocampus,
is a smaller mechanism storing information by changing weights in the synapses
between pyramidal cells. Within this mechanism is a mechanism that produces
long-term changes at a synapse bymodifying the synapse’s N-methyl-D-aspartate
(NMDA) receptors. hose NMDA receptors undergo change because of yet smaller
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mechanisms governing their functioning. Amechanistic explanation of themouse’s
cognitive capacity involves appeal to multiplemechanisms at multiple spatial scales
and showing how they work in concert to produce the cognitive capacity (Craver
2007). he relationship between higher and lower levels goes beyond the mere
mereological whole–part relation. Higher level mechanisms are not just part of,
but also are realized by lower level mechanisms. Lower level mechanisms form the
component parts of higher level mechanisms. Cognitive capacities are explained by
showing howmechanisms at diòerent spatial scales, integrated by themechanistic
realization relation, produce the cognitive capacity in question.
Descriptions of mechanisms at diòerent levels of spatial scale have a degree of
autonomy from each other. A description of amechanism at one spatial level may
be silent about how that mechanism’s component parts work, or about the larger
system in which themechanism is embedded. Onemight, for example, describe
how cells in themouse hippocampus store amap of locationswhile remaining silent
about the lower level mechanism that produces synaptic change. Onemight also
describe how cells in the hippocampus store amap of locations while remaining
silent about how those cells are recruited by the entiremouse to solve the task.
his partial autonomy between descriptions at diòerent spatial levels is not full-
blown independence. he autonomy arises becausemechanistic realization allows
for the (logical) possibility ofmultiple realization. It is possible for the component
parts of amechanism to be realized in multiple ways, within the constraints that
the performance of themechanism dictates. It is also possible for themechanism
to be embedded in multiple larger contexts, within the constraints that the context
should support the operation of themechanism. Description at a particular level
of spatial scale places some constraints on higher or lower level descriptions, but
leaves some degree of freedom. his degree of freedom allows diòerent teams of
inquirers to focus on discovering mechanisms at diòerent spatial scales in a partially
autonomous manner. It allows scientiûc inquiry in the psychological sciences to
split into diòerent ûelds: biochemistry, cellular biology, neurophysiology, cognitive
neuroscience, and behavioral ecology.
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) claimed that scientiûc disciplines are structured
into autonomous levels corresponding to the spatial scale of their subject matter.
We are now in a position to seewhat is right about this idea. here is no necessity for
scientiûc inquiry to be structured by levels of spatial scale. Nevertheless, structuring
scientiûc inquiry in the psychological sciences by spatial scale is permissible. It is
permissible because the ontologically layered structure generated by themechanistic
realization relation, and the partial autonomy between levels of spatial scale that
this provides, allows scientiûc inquiry to proceed at diòerent spatial scales along
relatively separate tracks. he structuring of scientiûc disciplines by levels of spatial
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scale that Oppenheim and Putnam describe is a consequence of the ontological
layering, and partial autonomy, generated by themechanistic realization relation.
Marr (1982) introduced a distinct kind of level of inquiry into the psychological
sciences. Marr argued that the psychological and cognitive sciences should be
divided into three levels of explanation.
Marr’s ûrst level is the ‘computational’ level. he aim of inquiry at the computational
level is to describe which task an organism solves in a particular circumstance and
why that task is important to the organism. A task should be understood as an exten-
sional function: a pattern of input and output behavior. In order to discover which
function an organism computes, we need to understand the ecological purpose
of computing that function – why the organism computes this function and what
computation of this function would allow the organism to achieve. Without a guess
as to the ecological purpose of computing this function, there would be no way of
picking out from the vast number of things that the organism does (its patterns of
input–output behavior) which are relevant to cognition.
Marr’s second level is the ‘algorithmic’ level. he aim of inquiry at the algorithmic
level is to answer how the organism solves its task. he answer should consist in an
algorithm: a ûnite number of simple steps that take one from input to output. Many
diòerent algorithms compute the same extensional function. herefore, even if we
were to know which extensional function the organism computes, the algorithm
would still be le open. In order to discover which algorithm an organism uses,
researchers look for indirect clues about the information-processing strategies
exploited by the organism, such as the organism’s reaction times and susceptibility
to errors.
Marr’s third level is the ‘implementation’ level. he aim of inquiry at the implement-
ation level is to describe how steps in the algorithm map onto physical changes.
Even if we were to know both the extensional function and the algorithm, that
would still leave open how the algorithm is implemented in physical changes of the
organism. he brain is a complex physical system. Without some guide as to which
parts of the brain implement which parts of an algorithm, there would be no way
to know how the brain enables the organism to solve its task. he implementation
level identiûes which physical parts are functionally signiûcant: which parts are
relevant, and in which ways, to the computation that the organism performs. In the
case of an electronic PC, electrical changes inside the silicon chips are functionally
signiûcant; the color of the silicon chips or the noise the cooling fan makes are not.
Researchers look for implementation level descriptions by using techniques such
as magnetic resonance imaging, electroencephalograms, single-cell recording, and
testing how performance is aòected when physical resources are damaged (e.g., by
stroke) or temporarily disabled (e.g., by drugs).
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Marr’s three levels are not the same as the levels of spatial organization in mech-
anisms described previously. he levels of spatial organization in mechanisms
involve positing an ontological layering relation: psychological mechanisms are
related smaller to larger bymechanistic realization; component parts are realized
by increasingly smaller mechanisms. One consequence of this ontological layering
is that scientiûc inquiry at diòerent spatial scales can be structured into partially
autonomous domains (from biochemistry to behavioral ecology). Structuring sci-
entiûc inquiry into levels is a consequence, not the principal content, of the claim. In
contrast, the principal content ofMarr’s claim is that scientiûc inquiry, not ontology,
should be structured. Marr divides work in the psychological sciences into three
types of inquiry: computational, algorithmic, and implementational. here is no
assumption that this division is accompanied by a division in the ontology. Marr’s
claim is simply that the psychological sciences should pursue three types of question
if they are to explain psychological capacities adequately.
Computational, algorithmic, and implementational questions concern a single sys-
tem at a single level of spatial scale. hey also concern a single capacity: which
extensional function that capacity instantiates, which algorithm computes that func-
tion, and how that algorithm is physically implemented. In contrast, each level of
themechanistic scale concerns a diòerent physical system: the entire organism, the
brain, brain regions, neural circuits, individual neurons, and subcellular mechan-
isms. Each level of scale concerns a diòerent capacity: the capacity of the whole
organism to navigate amaze, the capacity of the hippocampus to store spatial in-
formation, the capacity of pyramidal synapses to undergo long-term potentiation
(LTP), and so on. At each level of spatial scale, and for each corresponding capacity
and system, one can ask Marr’s questions:Which function does the physical system
compute and why? Which algorithm does it use to compute this function? How is
that algorithm implemented by physical changes in the system? Marr’s questions
cut across those concerning mechanisms at diòerent levels of spatial scale.
Marr claimed a degree of autonomy, but not full independence, between his levels.
he autonomy that exists between Marr’s levels derives from two properties of
computation. First, the same extensional function can be computed by diòerent
algorithms. Second, the same algorithm can be implemented in diòerent ways. he
ûrst propertymeans that proposing a particular function at the computational level
does not restrict algorithmic-level inquiry to a particular algorithm. he second
propertymeans that proposing a particular algorithm at the algorithmic level does
not restrict implementation-level inquiry to a particular physical implementation.
Similar degrees of freedom do not hold in reverse. If one were to propose a partic-
ular implementation – amapping from physical activity in the system to steps of
some algorithm – then the algorithm that the system employs would be thereby
ûxed. Similarly, if one were to propose that the system uses a particular algorithm,
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then the extensional function that the system computes would be thereby ûxed.
he autonomy between Marr’s levels is downwards only: lower levels are partially
autonomous from upper levels, but not vice versa.
Downwards autonomy inMarr’s scheme, like the autonomy between levels of inquiry
about mechanisms at diòerent spatial scales, is only present as a logical possibility.
he degree of autonomy is likely to be attenuated in practice. Downwards autonomy
for Marr derives from the two logical properties of computation described earlier.
However, the psychological sciences are constrained bymore than what is logically
possible. heir concern is what is reasonable to think given all we know about the
brain and agent. he numbers of permissible algorithms and implementations are
likely to be signiûcantly less than those that are logically possible when constraints
are added about the resources that the brain can employ, the time the system can
take to solve its task, assumptions made in other areas of the psychological sciences
are taken into account.
he autonomy between Marr’s levels of inquiry is diòerent from that between levels
of inquiry concerningmechanisms at diòerent spatial scales. he autonomy between
Marr’s levels of inquiry derives from two properties of computation: that many
algorithms compute the same function and that there aremany ways to implement
the same algorithm. he autonomy between levels of inquiry concerning mech-
anisms at diòerent spatial scales derives from two properties of the mechanistic
realization relation: that it is possible for diòerent mechanisms to produce the same
causal power, and that the samemechanism could be embedded in diòerent con-
texts. he latter two properties give rise to an in principle upward and downward
autonomy between levels of spatial scale. Positing amechanism at a particular level
of spatial scale does not ûx how its smaller component parts work, nor does it ûx
how that mechanism is embedded in a larger system. Autonomy between levels of
inquiry concerning mechanisms at diòerent spatial scales is bi-directional. his is
formally distinct from the downwards-only autonomy associated with Marr’s levels
of computational explanation.
5 Individuating
Disagreements within philosophy of the psychological sciences are sometimes not
about the causal ow involved in cognition, but how to individuate that causal
ow. Two philosophical camps may agree on the basic causal relations, but disagree
about which of the elements in the causal structure are cognitive, representational,
perceptual, sensory, doxastic, gustatory, olfactory, and so on. hese disagreements
may give outsiders the appearance of being merely verbal. But this is rarely the case.
18
he competing sides agree on the meanings of their words. What they disagree
about is how cognitive capacities, processes, and states should be individuated.
In this section, I look at two examples of this kind of dispute. he ûrst is the
disagreement about how to individuate the senses. he second is the disagreement
about whether human mental states and processes extend outside our brains and
bodies.
he senses are diòerentways of perceiving, such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting,
and smelling. What makes two senses diòerent? How many senses are there?
Under which conditions would an organism have a new sense? he psychological
sciences provide data that appear to challenge folk ideas about the senses. Novel
sensemodalities seem to exist in non-human animals, including magnetic senses,
electric senses, infrared senses, and echolocation. Humans seem to have senses
for pressure, temperature, pain, balance, and their internal organs in addition to
their traditional ûve senses. Neural processing of sensory information in humans
is multimodal; visual areas in the brain are not exclusively visual and integrate
information from sound and other stimuli. Blindsight patients appear to have vision
without associated visual phenomenology or consciously accessible beliefs. Tactile-
visual sensory substitution (TVSS)-equipped patients appear to see via touch. Based
on this information, should we revise the folk view that humans have ûve senses? If
so, how? In order to answer this question, we need a way to individuate the senses.
Let us look at four contenders.
he ûrst is representation-based. Suppose that each sense has an object or property
that is exclusively detected and represented by that sense – its ‘proper sensible’. he
proper sensibles of hearing, tasting, smelling, and seeing are sound, avor, odor, and
color respectively. According to the representation-based view, the representations
of these proper sensibles – representations that are not generated in any other way –
individuate the senses. A sense is individuated by the characteristic representations
that the sense produces. A challenge for the view is that it lands us with a new
problem: How do we individuate the sensory representations? It is not clear that
this is substantially easier than the original problemof how to individuate the senses.
he second approach is experience-based. Hearing, tasting, smelling, seeing, and
touch are each associatednot onlywithdistinct representations, but alsowithdistinct
subjective phenomenal experiences. he phenomenal experiences tend to be similar
within sensory modalities and diòerent between sensory modalities. According
to the experience-based view, it is because sensory experiences are phenomenally
similar to and diòerent from each other that we have distinct senses. A sense
is individuated by the types of phenomenal experience to which it gives rise. A
challenge for the view is to say what are the relevant similarities and diòerences in
phenomenal experience. Experiences within a sensory modality are not all alike
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and those between sensorymodalities are not all dissimilar. Which phenomenal
similarities and diòerences matter for individuating the senses, and why are they
important?
he third approach is stimulus-based. Diòerent senses involve responding to prox-
imal stimuli of diòerent physical kinds. Seeing involves reacting to electromagnetic
waves between 380 nm and 750 nm. Hearing involves reacting to air pressure waves
in the ear canal. Smelling involves reacting to airborne chemicals in the nose. Ac-
cording to the stimulus-based view, the reasonwhy the senses are distinct is because
they involve responses to diòerent physical types of proximal stimulus. A sense is
individuated by type of proximal stimulus towhich the organism reacts. A challenge
for the view is that the same proximal stimulus could be associated with diòerent
senses. For example, the same pressure wave in the air may be processed by an
organism for hearing and for echolocation.
he ûnal approach is organ-based. Diòerent senses tend to be associated with
diòerent sense organs. Seeing involves the eyes, hearing involves the ears, smelling
involves the nose. Each sense organ contains physiologically distinct receptor cells.
According to the organ-based view, the reasonwhy the senses are distinct is because
they employ distinct sense organs. A sense is individuated by its associated sense
organ. A challenge for the view is that the same sense organ (e.g., the ear) could be
used for two diòerent senses (e.g., hearing and echolocation).
he four proposals prescribe diòerent revisions to folk assumptions about the senses
in light of scientiûc data. he task facing philosophers is to determine which, if
any, of these views is correct. Nudds (2004) argues that we should not endorse any
of them. His claim is that individuation of the senses is context-dependent. No
single account individuates the senses across all contexts. Diòerent criteria apply
in diòerent contexts depending on our interests. Macpherson (2011) argues that
the senses should be individuated context-independently. She claims that all of the
criteria abovematter. All contribute jointly to individuating the senses. he four
proposals can be used as amultidimensional metric on which any possible sense
can be judged. he clustering of an organism’s cognitive capacities across multiple
dimensions, rather than on a single dimension, determines how its senses should
be individuated.
Let us turn to our second example of a dispute about individuation. hehypothesis of
extended cognition (HEC) asserts that humanmental life sometimes extends outside
the brain and takes place partly inside objects in the environment, such as notebooks
or iPhones (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Disagreements about whether HEC is true
have taken the form of a disagreement about the individuation conditions of human
mental states and processes.
he best way to understandHEC is to start with the weaker claim known as distrib-
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uted cognition (Hutchins 1995). An advocate of distributed cognition claims that
human cognitive capacities do not always arise solely in, and should not always
be explained exclusively in terms of, neural mechanisms. hemechanisms behind
human cognitive capacities sometimes include bodily and environmental processes.
he brain is not the solemechanism responsible for our cognitive abilities, but is
only part – albeit a large part – of a wider story. he brain recruits environmental
and bodily resources to solve problems. Recruiting these resources allows humans
to domore than they could otherwise, and toworkmore quickly and reliably. Brains
oò-load work onto the body and environment. Sometimes the oò-loading is under
conscious control: for example, when we consciously decide to use a pen, paper,
or our ûngers to solve amathematical problem. Sometimes the oò-loading is not
under conscious control: for example, when we use our eye gaze to store informa-
tion (Ballard et al. 1997; Gray and Fu 2004). Distributed cognition is the claim that
distributed information-processing strategies ûgure in the best explanation of, and
causal story behind, some human cognitive accomplishments.
HEC is a stronger claim than distributed cognition. According to HEC, not only
do brains recruit environmental resources to solve problems, but those non-neural
resources, when they have been recruited, also havemental properties. Parts of the
environment and the body, when employed in distributed cognition strategies, have
just as much claim to mental or cognitive status as any neural process. Against this,
the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC) accepts the distributed-cognition
claim about the exploitation of bodily and environmental resources, but rejects
HEC’s assertion about the body and environment having mental properties (Rupert
2004, 2013). According to HEMC, non-neural resources, despite ûguring in the
explanation and causal story behind some cognitive accomplishments, do not have
mental properties. Only neural processes havemental or cognitive properties.
How is this about individuation? HEC is, in essence, a claim about the individuation
ofmental kinds. HEC claims that the causal ow in human cognition should be
individuated in such a way that the neural and non-neural parts instantiate a single
kind – a mental kind. his is not to say that there are no diòerences relevant to
psychology between the neural and non-neural parts. HEC’s claim is merely that
the neural and non-neural parts jointly satisfy a condition suõcient for them to
instantiate a singlemental kind. In contrast,HEMC’s claim is that the causal ow
in human cognition should be individuated so that the neural and non-neural parts
fall under diòerent kinds –mental and non-mental respectively. his is not to say
that there are no kinds of interest to psychology that both instantiate. Rather, it is
to say that whatever kinds they instantiate, they jointly fail to meet the condition
required for them to instantiate a singlemental kind. HEC andHEMC disagree, it
cases of distributed cognition, about how to individuatemental properties across
the causal ow.
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Which view is right: HEC or HEMC? To answer this, we need to agree on the
minimal condition,mentioned earlier, for a physical process to instantiate amental
kind. here are two main proposals on this score. he ûrst is functionalist. On
this view, a physical state or process is mental provided it has the right functional
proûle. I have argued elsewhere that the functionalist proposal decisively favorsHEC
(Sprevak 2009). If one does not accept HEC granted functionalism, one concedes
the chauvinism about the mind that functionalism was designed to avoid. he
second proposal is based on explanatory pay-oò to cognitive science. On this view,
a physical state or process is mental just in case it ûts with best (current or future)
cognitive science to treat it as such. I have argued elsewhere that considerations
of explanatory value regarding cognitive science are toothless to decide between
HEC andHEMC. Cognitive science could continue to be conducted with little or
no loss either way (Sprevak 2010). he dispute between HEC andHEMC is a case
in point for which a question about individuation ofmental states and processes
cannot be answered by a straightforward appeal to scientiûc practice. Work in
philosophy of the psychological and cognitive sciences needs to draw on a wide
range of considerations to settle such questions about individuation.
6 Conclusion
We have surveyed four types of task in philosophy of the psychological and cognitive
sciences: How should we interpret our scientiûc theories? How should we precisify
our theoretical concepts? How do our theories or methodologies ût together? How
should our cognitive states, processes, and capacities be individuated? We have
focused on only some of current work in philosophy of the psychological and
cognitive sciences. Work we have not covered includes proposals for psychological
mechanisms and architectures (for example, Apperly and Butterûll 2009; Grush
2004); analysis of scientiûcmethodology in the psychological sciences (Glymour
2001; Machery 2013); examination of key experimental results in the psychological
sciences (Block 2007; Shea and Bayne 2010); and analysis of folk psychological
concepts (Gray, Gray andWegner 2007; Knobe and Prinz 2008).
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